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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 1,2002, the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina enacted its amended Rule 5.03. 1 New subsection (C) of this local rule, as 
amended, prevents settlement agreements filed with the court from being placed 
under seal pursuant to the preexisting rule's requirements. By including this 
language, South Carolina's federal judges have taken a courageous first step by 
moving to ban secret settlements in their courts. They should be accorded credit 
not just for proposing the rule, but also for the forthright comments of Chief Judge 
Joseph Anderson Jr} and for raising the consciousness of other courts, attorneys, 
and the press on this important issue. 
As helpful as the new rule is, if it is to accomplish its goal of preventing the 
court from being involved in the "secretizing" of information, it unfortunately does 
not go far enough. First, the rule excludes the vast majority of settlements-all 
those not filed with the court. Second, it remains permissible to "restrict access to 
documents ... not filed with the Court.,,3 This, of course, includes the vast 
majority of discovery. Third, Local Rule 26.08,4 referred to in Rule 5.03, both 
excludes unfiled discovery and allows a procedure whereby "protective 
agreements"-as opposed to the "settlement agreements" governed by Rule 
5.03 (C}--may be secretized by following the procedural hurdles contained in Rule 
1. See D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03, which states in pertinent part (new language in italics): 
5.03 FILING DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL. Absent a requirement to seal in the 
governing rule, statute, or order, any party seeking to file documents under seal 
shall follow the mandatory procedure described below. Failure to obtain prior 
approval as required by this Rule shall result in summary denial of any request or 
attempt to seal filed documents. Nothing in this Rule limits the ability of the 
parties, by agreement, to restrict access to documents which are not filed with the 
Court. See Local Civil Rule 26.08. 
(C) No settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be sealed pursuant to the 
terms of this Rule. 
2. See Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2,2002, at AI, (quoting Judge Anderson, in a letter to his colleagues: 
Here is a rare opportunity for our court to do the right thing ... and take the lead 
nationally in a time when the Arthur AndersenlEnroniCatholic priest 
controversies are undermining public confidence in our institutions and causing 
a growing suspicion of things that are kept secret by public bodies.). 
3. D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03. 
4. D.S.C. LocAL R. 26.08, Protective Orders And Agreements: 
There is no requirement for prior judicial approval of protective agreements 
intended to limit access to and use of materials gained in discovery. Protective 
agreements or orders which address the filing of documents with the Court shall, 
however, require compliance with Local Civil Rule 5.03, or such other procedures 
as the Court directs, before any document is filed under seal. Discovery materials 
protected by a court order issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) shall not be 
filed without compliance with Local Civil Rule 5.03 unless the order provides 
other procedures to satisfy the requirements of governing case law. See Local 
Civil Rule 5.Q3. 
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5.03(A).S While those hurdles include the requirement that the moving party 
explain the need for "less drastic alternatives to sealing," in the case of "protective 
agreements,"-i.e., those presumably stipulated to by the parties--careful court 
scrutiny is neither mandated nor, in my view, likely. 
This Article focuses primarily on the district court rule. In most respects, the 
same analysis and argument also apply to the similar but somewhat enigmatic new 
South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41.1.6 I would be remiss ifl did not briefly 
address this rule, especially the most interesting sentence: "This Rule does not 
apply to private settlement agreements and shall not be interpreted as approving 
confidentiality provisions in private settlement agreements where the parties agree 
to have the matter voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41 (a)(1), SCRCP, without court 
involvement. ,,7 The first half of this enigmatic sentence is clear: As with the local 
federal rule, private agreements to "secretize" settlements are not covered. This 
would appear to include all agreements to return or destroy unfiled discovery or 
other information and any agreement not presented to the court. The second 
portion implies that the court does not want to be seen as approving secrecy sub 
silentio, but apparently that is exactly what will happen when the court is not 
directly involved. 
However, this is not necessarily so, according to Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal 
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina.s In her remarks to a University of South 
Carolina School of Law conference in which this paper was also presented, Justice 
Toal made clear that the court intended to do "more than provid[ e] a football field" 
for opposing combatants.9 She insisted that the phrase "not ... approving 
5. D.S.C. LocAL R. 5.03(A) provides: 
A party seeking to file documents under seal shall file and serve a "Motion 
to Seal" accompanied by a memorandum. See Local Civil Rule 7.04. The 
memorandum shall: (1) identify, with specificity, the documents or portions 
thereof for which sealing is requested; (2) state the reasons why sealing is 
necessary; (3) explain (for each document or group of documents) why less 
drastic alternatives to sealing will not afford adequate protection; and (4) address 
the factors goveming sealing of documents reflected in controlling case law. A 
non-confidential descriptive index of the documents at issue shall be attached to 
the motion. 
A separately sealed attachment labeled "Confidential Infonnation to be 
Submitted to Court in Connection with Motion to Seal" shall be submitted with 
the motion. This attachment shall contain the documents at issue for the Court's 
in camera review and shall not be filed. The Court's docket shall reflect that the 
motion and memorandum were filed and were supported by a sealed attachment 
submitted for in camera review. 
(citations omitted). 
6. S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1 (adopted May 5, 2003). 
7. S.C. R. CIv. P. 41.1(a). 
8. Jean Hoefer Toal, The New Rule of Secret Settlements in the South Carolina Justice System, 
Address at the Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy: Formation, Debate and Application of South 
Carolina s New Secrecy Rules (Oct. 24, 2003) (video on file with the South Carolina Law Review) 
[hereinafter Toal Remarks]. 
9. [d. 
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confidentiality"IO meant that the courts would apply South Carolina's constitutional 
presumption of openness and referred to a 1991 ruling that allowed a third party to 
intervene to object to a protective order sealing a file. I I Chief Justice Toal 
submitted that when Rule 41.1 was read in light of this case, a secret settlement 
agreement not presented to the court might well be found unenforceable. 12 
Like district court Rule 5.03(A), Rule 41.1 (b) sets up a series of hurdles for 
sealing documents. 13 These hurdles specifically refer to "the public health and 
safety.,,14 As in the federal district court rule, however, there is no allowance for 
scrutinizing agreements to seal or to submit to a protective order. Finally, Rule 
41.1 (c) contains a series of hurdles that, if met, would exempt even the settlement 
agreement from being open, although it understandably limits openness regarding 
fmances in family law matters. 
Despite these problems, awareness of the secrecy issues by South Carolina 
judges-including Chief Justice Toal and especially, given his public remarks and 
correspondence, Chief Judge Anderson-is a marked departure from what! learned 
from my discussions with trial court and appellate judges in the not-too-distant past. 
At the Roscoe Pound Institute Forum in July, 2000,IS which focused on secret 
settlements and occurred not long before the Firestone tire story broke and attracted 
substantial attention to the issue,16 many members of the bench were surprised to 
hear of even the existence of a secrecy and public-safety problem. In our workshop 
discussions, it quickly became clear that secrecy, usually lawyer-driven and not 
requiring court approval, was simply flying below the judges' radar. 
This lack of awareness is hardly surprising. There is no doubt that the majority 
of information exchanged in litigation is in the form of unfiled 
discovery--discovery that is handled entirely by lawyers and outside the view of 
the court. When the settlement of a case includes secretizing this discovery, the 
courts-which see neither the settlement agreement and release, nor the secrecy 
provision, nor the agreement to return unfiled discovery-are unaware of what truly 
happened. Even stipulations for protective orders, unless accompanied by rules of 
court with strong presumptions of openness and mandated court scrutiny, are not 
likely to alert the bench. 
This secretization is accomplished in a forum provided and paid for by the 
public. While it may occur outside the view of the court, it is not outside the court's 
purview, since it almost always occurs in connection with a lawsuit filed in the 
10. S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1 (a). 
11. Davis v. Jennings, 304 S.C. 502, 405 S.E.2d 601 (1991). This case was included in the 
materials Chief Justice Toal provided at the Court-Enforced Secrecy Symposium. 
12. Toal Remarks, supra note 8. 
13. D.S.C. LocAL R. 5.03(A), supra note 1; S.C. R. CIv. P. 4 1.1 (b). 
14. S.C. R. CIV. P. 4 1.1 (b). 
15. The Roscoe Pound Institute Annual Forum/or State Court Judges, Chicago (July 2000). 
16. See, e.g., Richmond Eustis, Firestone Fails to Keep Ga. Wreck File Sealed, FuLTON COUNTY 
DAlLY REp., Sept. 29, 2000 (reporting on sealed court documents arising out of auto accidents caused 
by defective tires); James V. Grimaldi & Carrie Johnson, Factory Linked to Bad Tires: Data Point to 
Plant in North Carolina, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2000, at EI. 
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court's venue. There is no question that courts thus have inherent power to regulate 
the conduct of the parties and their lawyers in matters filed in those courts and may 
prevent secrecy agreements regardless of the circumstances in which they occur. 
The purview of this Article is those secret settlements, stipulations for 
protective orders, agreements to return discovery and secretize other information, 
and similar devices that result in hiding information from the public that concerns 
a substantial danger to the public health or safety. One might argue both sides of 
the question of whether secrecy should be severely curtailed in ordinary cases; I do 
not address that issue. Rather, I submit that in those cases where secret settlements 
conceal information which, if known, would be reasonably likely to protect the 
public or even save lives, courts as a policy matter should create a broad 
presumption of openness, put teeth in rules that cover unfiled discovery and other 
documents, prevent stipulations to "protect" disclosure of information about public 
dangers, and through these and other means, ensure that the interests of public 
health and safety will trump any arguable privacy interests of the litigants. 
Local Rule S.03(C) is a good start. But it is just that-a start. This Article 
commends that honorable court to fmish the job it began and provide further 
protection to the public it wishes to serve. 
II. ABSENT STRONGER RULES, SECRECY WILL CONTINUE TO ENDANGER THE 
PUBLIC 
To clarify the terminology used throughout this paper, the term "secret 
settlements" refers to agreements between plaintiffs and defense lawyers to keep 
information about a known harm-whether it is a defective product, toxic waste, 
or a molesting soccer coach-from the public. The plaintiff gets a large (sealed) 
settlement; the defendant gets silence; the public gets shortchanged. I do not object 
to keeping the amount of the settlement secret; there are valid reasons for doing 
this. Rather, my concern is with parties' private settlement agreements that 
"secretize" information about the claimed harm, usually obtained through 
independent investigation or open discovery. 17 
Chief Judge Anderson was right when he wrote, "Some of the early Firestone 
tire cases were settled with court-ordered secrecy agreements that kept the Firestone 
tire problem from coming to light until many years later .... Arguably, some lives 
were lost because judges signed secrecy agreements .... "18 But many more lives 
were and are lost because parties and their attorneys continue to put their interests 
ahead of public safety and sign secrecy agreements, most of which do not require 
court approval. 
After the Firestone story broke, most reports estimated that shredding tires had 
17. The focus on public health and safety rather than monetary figures is narrower than that 
covered by some rules, including both South Carolina rules. While a broader scope may be wise, 
allowing secrecy to cover settlement amounts and other financial information affects a non-substantive 
issue and obviates the need for exceptions to rules, such as that contemplated by S.C. R. CIY. P. 41.I(c). 
18. See Liptak, supra note 2, at AI. 
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caused the deaths of over 100 innocent victims and resulted in scores of cases 
settled secretly. Firestone was not the first such story, nor the last, but the danger 
dujour in a series of horror stories involving secrecy. However, its timing brought 
the issue of secret settlements to the front pages and thus to a broader American 
audience. 
Before Firestone, there were the prescription drugs Zomax and Halcion, the 
Shiley heart valve, and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, all taken off the 
market as too dangerous, but not until after many years and hundreds of secret 
settlements. 19 The public was left in the dark long after the products' defects were 
well-known to those involved in litigation. 
An English investigation provided the proof against Halcion, and disclosures 
about Zomax came "only after a scientist experienced a potentially fatal allergic 
reaction and decided to investigate.,,2o By the time Zomax was taken off the 
market, "it was reportedly responsible for a dozen deaths and over four hundred 
severe allergic reactions, almost all of which were kept quiet through secret 
settlements worked out by McNeil, the drug's manufacturer.'>21 Attorneys for A. 
H. Robins, the Dalkon Shield's manufacturer, even tried to condition their secret 
settlements on plaintiffs' lawyers' promises never to take another Dalkon case-a 
clear ethics violation.22 
In 1993, General Motors (GM) sued Ralph Nader and the Center for Auto 
Safety for defamation in allegations concerning GM pickup trucks with side-
mounted gas tanks. Meanwhile, other GM lawyers were quietly settling exploding 
side-mounted gas tank cases, and had been settling them with startling frequency 
for years. In 1996, lawyers for the Nader defendants obtained GM's own records 
of those cases in discovery. They showed approximately 245 individual gas tank 
pickup cases, almost all settled, and almost all requiring the plaintiffs to keep the 
information they discovered secret. The earliest cases marked "closed" were filed 
in 1973 and the latest 23 years later, just before the records were turned over.23 
19. See, e.g., STEVEN D. LYDENBERG ET AL., RATING AMERICA'S CORPORATE CONSCIENCE: A 
PROVOCATIVE GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES BEHIND THE PRODUCTS YOU BUY EVERY DAY 234-35 
(Addison-Wesley 1986) (noting A.H. Robins Company's behavior during the Dalkon Shield litigation); 
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 197-98 
(Pantheon 1985) (same); Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts: 
Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEx. L. REv. 643 (1991) (chronicling the adoption and 
provisions of a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure dictating openness in civil proceedings); Bob Gibbins, 
Secrecy Versus Safety: Restoring the Balance, 77 A.B.A. J. 74 (Dec. 1991) (detailing uses of secrecy 
agreements and efforts to push for openness in court proceedings). 
20. See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER 187 (Ballantine 1999). 
21. Id. at 188. 
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2002) (providing that attorneys may not 
participate in agreements that restrict the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of a relationship). 
23. See American Judicature Society, Transcript, Confidential Settlements and Sealed Court 
Records: Necessary Safeguards or Unwarranted Secrecy?, 78 JUDICATURE 304 (1995); Stephen Gillers, 
Court Sanctioned Secrets Can Kill, L.A. TIMES, May 14,2003, at B13; Catherine Yang, A Disturbing 
Trend Toward Secrecy, Bus. WK., Oct. 2, 1995, at 60. Clarence Ditlow, director of the Center for Auto 
Safety in 1997 and 1998, provided the author with documentation of cases alleging GM truck fires. See 
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It is not, of course, just a matter of dangerous products. A home for the 
mentally disabled secretly settled a case accusing the home's administrator of 
sexually abusing a resident with Down's Syndrome; the administrator privately 
admitted to molesting over a dozen others.24 The Catholic Church's Chicago 
archdiocese secretly settled a molestation case, ostensibly to protect the child. An 
investigation by Chicago Lawyer discovered an estimated 400 lawsuits that the 
Catholic Church had settled in the previous decade-almost all of them secretly.25 
Beginning in January 2002, The Boston Globe reported almost continuously 
throughout the year that the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston had been 
confidentially settling cases involving priests that had sexually molested children 
and then reassigning the offending priests to unsuspecting parishioners elsewhere.26 
In most of these cases, court approval of the settlements was neither required 
nor sought. Such agreements settling lawsuits often involve returning all 
documents obtained through the legal discovery process. The evidence shows that 
secret settlements and unfiled discovery can contain information that will save lives 
and potentially prevent the recurrence of the incident that harmed the plaintiff. But 
current rules allow the "smoking gun," whether it concerns a tire, toxic dump, or 
pedophile, to be buried while more people are hurt. The courts are still involved 
because they oversee the discovery process. Without court rules that provide for 
open settlements, open discovery fights, and stricter rules on obtaining protective 
orders, these private agreements will remain off trial courts' radar screens, posing 
a danger to public health and safety. 
III. EFFORTS AT OPENNESS IN STATE AND FEDERAL ARENAS 
In the last five years, secrecy in settlements has become an increasingly 
common subject of articles in the popular legal press and more scholarly forums. 27 
Phillips v. GMC, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (D. Mont 2001) (discussing the total amounts of recovery in 
the GM cases), vacated and remanded Phillips v. GMC, 289 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002). 
24. Home for Disabled to Pay Undisclosed Settlement in Abuse Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 
June 10, 1994, at 7. 
25. Harvey Berkman, Boy Says Abuse; Priest, Ex-Nun Say Slander, CHI. LAW., January 1994). 
26. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements 
Kept Scope of Issue out of Public Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31,2002, at Al (noting efforts of Catholic 
Church to settle sexual abuse cases involving priests). 
27. See Laurie K. Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit 
of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283 (1999) (surveying the issue of secrecy from an ethics 
perspective); see, e.g., ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 20; Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements 
Scrutinized, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 20; Rebecca A. Womeldorf & William S.D. Cravens, More 
Sunshine Laws Proposed, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at B14; Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against 
Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS lIS 
(1999); Jill Hertz Blaustein, Sealed But Not Secret, LITIGATION NEWS, July 2002, at 2; Diana Digges, 
Confidential Settlements Under Fire in 13 States, LAWYER'S WEEKLY USA, Apr. 30, 2001, at B1; 
Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, TRiAL, June 1999, at 55; Kevin Livingston, 
Open Secrets: Rough Road Ahead for Legislators and Legal Ethicists Who Want to Ban Secret 
Settlements, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), May 8, 2001; James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, 
TRiAL, June 2003, at 18; Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, It Is Time to Question How Our Legal 
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In the last three years, the general media has increasingly addressed the issue 
including a front page article in the Los Angeles Times, an editorial in USA Today, 
a segment on 60 Minutes II, and numerous other articles. 28 This synergy has 
included a greater focus on the issue by many state courts and legislatures. But it 
was the actions of five states in the early to mid-1990s that led the way. 
A. State Attempts at Preventing Secret Settlements 
Many states have attempted to mitigate the hann of secret settlements. About 
a dozen states have endeavored to address the issue, either by court rule or statute, 
with varying degrees ofsuccess.29 Unfortunately, none of the states' rules directly 
address the issue ofunfiled settlements, and only Texas directly addresses unfiled 
discovery.3o Moreover, among the states that have examined the issue of secret 
settlements that present a hazard to the public, only five, before South Carolina, had 
succeeded in passing regulations governing such conduct. 
Over half of the states (29) have some kind of statute or rule regarding the 
sealing of court records in civil cases. According to a federal study, eight states 
prevent secretizing settlements when a public entity is a party.31 A recent Federal 
Judicial Center study on secret settlement agreements reported the status of various 
states' rules and statutes concerning the sealing of court records in civil matters 
between private parties. Their findings show: 
Five states explicitly require good cause to seal a court document 
(Delaware, Michigan, New York, Tennessee, Vermont). Four 
System Can Afford to Allow Secret Settlements, VOIR DIRE, Spring 2000, at 12; Richard Zitrin, Why 
Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Hann, PROF. LAW., Summer 2001, at I; Christine Hughes, 
Confidential Settlements: A White Paper, New England Legal Foundation, April 2003 (on file with the 
author). 
28. See Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Courts' Cloak o/Secrecy Be Deadly? Judicial Orders Protecting 
Companies Kept Tire Case Quiet; USA Today, Oct 16, 2000, at BI; Editorial, Lethal Secrets, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at B8; Davan Mahraraj, Goodyear Tire Fatalities Echo Firestone's Troubles, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25,2000, at AI; Editorial, Sealed Court Records Kept Tire Problems Hidden, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 19,2000, at 16A; 60 Minutes II: Hush Money? (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 
2000). See, e.g., Eustis, supra note 16; Gillers, supra note 23; Grimaldi & Johnson, supra note 16; Ben 
Kelly, Secret Court Settlements Prevent Needed Warnings, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 16,2002, at 18; 
Eileen McNamara, Courts Must End Secrecy, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2002, at Bl; Ray Shaw, 
Sunshine in Litigation, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2000, at 63; Roy Simon, Some Secrets Lawyers Shouldn't Keep, 
NEWSDAY, Aug. 16,2001, at A39; Richard A. Zitrin, Time to End the Secrecy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 
2001, at A17. 
29. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Lexis Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 
Supp. 2004); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 8. 119(f) (2002); LA. CODE CIY. PRAC. ANN. art. 1426 (West Supp. 
2004); TEx. R. CIY. P. 76a; WASH. REY. CODE § 4.24.611 (West Supp. 2004). For a current overview 
of the many states that have addressed this issue, see Hughes, supra note 27, at 21--42. 
30. See TEx. R. CIY. P. 76a(2)(c). 
31. See Federal Judicial Center, Sealed Settlement Agreements in Federal District Court, May 
2003 Progress Report (2003) (on file with author) (reporting that eight states-Arkansas, Colorado, 
Florida, Iowa, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Texas-proscribe as against public policy 
sealed or confidential settlement agreements when there is a public entity party). 
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states require a finding that privacy interests outweigh public 
interests (California, Idaho, Indiana, North Carolina); two states 
require that the privacy interests clearly outweigh public interests 
(Georgia, Utah); and one state requires the privacy interest to be 
compelling (Utah). 
Seven states permit sealing only if it is the least restrictive 
means available to serve the privacy interests (California, Florida, 
Idaho, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas). 
California also requires that sealing be narrowly tailored to the 
privacy interests and only necessary portions of the documents be 
sealed, to the extent feasible.32 
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This report reveals that few states have legislation or court rules that address 
the sealing of settlement agreements. Fewer still have rules or legislation that 
directly address the issue of sealing settlements or court records that may contain 
information that presents a public harm. Only Florida, Texas, Arkansas, 
Washington, and Louisiana have such regulations. Unfortunately, the application 
of these rules and statutes has been undercut, sometimes severely, either by 
subsequent court decisions interpreting the regulation or by ambiguous 
draftsmanship. It is valuable to look briefly at the effects of these rules in each of 
the five states to examine their strengths and shortcomings. I address each in 
chronological order. 
1. Florida 
In 1990, Florida was the first state to significantly regulate secret settlements 
when the legislature approved the "Sunshine in Litigation Act." The relevant part 
of this statute provides: 
(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the 
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any information 
concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be 
useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from 
injury which may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary 
to public policy, and may not be enforced.33 
This statute is an excellent trailblazer and appears to void portions of settlement 
agreements that secretize information about public hazards. However, the statute's 
effectiveness and how broadly it has been interpreted is not clear. First, and 
perhaps most significantly, although the statute sounds broad enough to apply to 
unfiled settlements or even to agreements to secretize discovery, no court has so 
ruled. Second, it appears that nothing in the statute prevents stipulations for 
32. [d. at 5. 
33. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West Supp. 2004). 
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protective orders entered between the parties that seal discovery, since they do not 
seem to be an "agreement or contract" within the meaning of the statute. Third, the 
defmition of "public hazard" is still unclear. According to one appellate case, 
"public hazard" does not include economic fraud,34 but what is included has not 
been concretely defmed. 
Finally, the statute may now require a court to determine whether there is a 
"public hazard" before that issue is established in litigation. An appellate court, 
citing constitutional procedural due process, held that summary resolution of this 
issue is improper and required the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
question.3S Since the statute, similar to the rules in Louisiana and Texas,36 gives 
standing to "[a]ny substantially affected person, including but not limited to 
representatives of news media,,,37 to insist on openness, a Florida trial court could 
fmd itself deciding whether a public hazard exists before the litigants have 
exchanged discovery on the issue, if the issue is joined by a third party at an early 
stage. 
2. Texas 
In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court, by a 4-3 vote, enacted a rule of civil 
procedure providing that court records are presumptively open.38 Rule 76a states 
in relevant part: 
[C]ourt records, as defmed in this rule, are presumed to be open 
to the general public and may be sealed only upon a showing of 
all of the following: 
(a) a specific serious and substantial interest which clearly 
outweighs: 
(1) this presumption of openness; 
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will 
have upon the general public health or 
safety; 
(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will 
adequately and effectively protect the specific interest 
asserted.39 
34. Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). See also 
State Fann Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski, 830 So. 2d 886, 887-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (stating 
that financial practices resulting in economic fraud do not constitute a ''public hazard" under Florida 
law). 
35. See DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
36. LA. CODE CIY. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (West Supp. 2004); TEx. R. CIY. P. 76a. 
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(6) (West Supp. 2004). 
38. TEx. R. CIY. P. 76a. 
39. TEx. R. CIY. P. 76a(I). 
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Rule 76a also provides for notice and hearing,40 thus avoiding the procedural 
due process problem of the Florida statute.41 Significantly, the Texas rule defines 
"court records" to include unfiled discovery and settlement agreements "that seek 
to restrict disclosure of information concerning matters that have a probable adverse 
effect upon the general public health or safety.,,42 By creating a presumption of 
openness where the public has a health or safety concern and by including filed and 
unfiled information, this excellent rule eliminates both secret settlements and the 
secretizing of information that could reveal a continuing harm to the public. 
Unfortunately, subsequent court decisions have severely undermined this rule. 
In 1998, despite the rule's clear language, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted 
Rule 76a to not include unfiled discovery within the defmition of "court records.,,43 
A 1999 case with a per curiam opinion is accompanied by three separate opinions 
from judges badly divided on the issue of what constituted court records.44 
Consequently, Rule 76a remains substantially weakened by judicial fiat. 
3. Arkansas 
Arkansas passed legislation in 1991 that relates to the disclosure of information 
that presents an "environmental hazard," defining that term broadly to include 
conditions that "affect land, air, or water in a way that may cause harm to the 
property or person of someone other than the contracting parties to a lawsuit 
settlement contract .... "45 However, the Arkansas statute does not defme who has 
standing to sue, does not specifically affect the court's ability to seal settlements, 
and does not appear to include unfiled information.46 There are no appellate 
decisions interpreting this statute, so it is still unclear how effective it has been 
since its passage. 
4. Washington 
Washington enacted a statute in 1994 that presumes openness in settlement 
agreements.47 It states, "Confidentiality provisions may be entered into or ordered 
or enforced by the court only if the court fmds, based on the evidence, that the 
confidentiality provision is in the public interest. ,,48 The statute defmes a 
confidentiality provision as: 
40. TEx. R. CIV. P. 76a(3)-(4). 
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081. 
42. TEx. R. CIv. P. 76a(2)(b)-(c). 
43. Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 523, (Tex. 1998). See also In re Cont. Gen. Tire, 
Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998) (noting that the court disagrees with premise that "all discoverable 
trade secrets will likely constitute 'court records' under Rule 76a"). The fact that both these cases 
involved tire companies is of at least passing interest. 
44. In re Dallas Morning News, Inc., lOS. W.3d 298 (Tex. 1999). 
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Lexis Supp. 2003). 
46.ld. 
47. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.611 (West Supp. 2004). 
48. Id. § 4.24.61l(4)(b). 
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[A]ny [tenn or] terms in a court order Qr a private agreement 
settling, concluding, or terminating a product liabilitylhazardous 
substance claim, that limit the possession, disclosure, or 
dissemination of infonnation about an alleged hazard to the 
public, whether those terms are integrated in the order or private 
agreement or written separately.49 
The presumption of openness in the Washington statute requires the court to 
determine not only whether the infonnation in the secrecy provision presents a 
hazard to the public, but also whether the provision in question is in the public's 
interest. The court is invited to balance the interest in protecting trade and 
commercial secrets against the public's right to understand the risks presented by 
the alleged hazard. 
While the Washington statute on its face discusses the limits of court orders, 
secrecy provisions during pending litigation are covered by procedures for issuing 
a protective order, while secrecy provisions terminating litigation-usually 
settlement agreements-are controlled by this statute. Thus, the statute does not 
address protective orders/o leaving a gaping hole in the antisecrecy process by 
allowing stipulations for protective orders to proceed unfettered by anything other 
than routine court ratification. 
Moreover, the Washington statute is narrowly limited to products liability and 
hazardous substance cases.51 This excludes many public dangers, such as serial 
molesters, and provides ammunition for others with cases on the cusp of the 
covered categories to argue that the statute did not intend to include their cases. 
The solution to this last problem is not difficult: Follow Texas' lead by emphasizing 
the danger to the public, rather than the type of act or circumstance that causes that 
danger. 52 
5. Louisiana 
Louisiana addressed secret settlements in 1995 with a rule of civil procedure. 
The rule's language is very close to the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act. 53 There 
are no appellate decisions addressing Louisiana's legislation. The rule states in 
relevant part: 
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or 
effect of concealing a public hazard, any infonnation relating to 
a public hazard, or any infonnation which may be useful to 
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury that 
49. [d. § 4.24.611(1)(b). 
50. [d. § 4.42.61 1 (4)(a). 
51. [d. § 4.42.611(1)(a). 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West Supp. 2004). 
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might result from a public hazard is null and shall be void and 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy, unless such 
information is a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information.54 
895 
The Louisiana rule also gives standing to substantially affected persons and 
media representatives. 55 Thus, a Louisiana court-as in Florida---could potentially 
find itself deciding whether a public hazard exists before the litigants have 
exchanged discovery on the issue. As with Florida's legislation, the Louisiana rule 
appears to apply to unfiled settlement agreements and may even extend to 
agreements relating to unfiled discovery, although no court has determined these 
issues. As in Florida, the term "public hazard" is unclear. Moreover, it appears that 
nothing prevents stipulations for protective orders agreed to by the parties; the last 
phrase quoted above seems to invite attempts to stipulate broadly to protective 
orders. 
Each of the states previously described have attempted to address secret 
settlements and their detrimental effect on the public. While they have had varying 
degrees of success, they have started a trend that has expanded to legislatures and 
courts across the country. Indeed, in 2003, this trend influenced--directly or 
indirectly-the South Carolina District Court to prevent settlements filed with the 
court from being sealed under its Local Rule 5.03.56 However, opponents of 
openness in litigation are fighting the application of these rules through appellate 
court litigation, and by combing for loopholes in ambiguous language. Such 
attacks on what is sound public policy will only be prevented by even stronger rules 
of court. 
B. Federal Attempts at Preventing Secret Settlements 
Sunshine in litigation has made less progress at the federal level. In 1991, 
when Florida and Texas were passing their sunshine in litigation reforms, efforts 
to implement federal guidelines controlling the sealing of court documents and 
affecting the confidentiality of government settlements were defeated in Congress. 57 
Subsequent efforts to introduce a federal sunshine act also failed. 58 
54. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (West Supp. 2004). 
55. [d. art. 1426(A). 
56. See D.S.C. LocALR. 5.03. 
57. See H.R. 3803, 102d Congo (1991). For an analysis of federal sunshine in litigation efforts, 
see Dore, supra note 27, at 311-12 n.117. 
58. See S. 1404, 103d Congo (1993); 140 CONGo REc. 14424 (103d Congo Amend. 1930 to S. 687) 
(1994); S. 374, l04th Congo (1995). See also Laurie Kratky Dore, The Confidentiality Debate and the 
Push to Regulate Secrecy in Civil Litigation, at 12 n.19, The 2000 Roscoe Pound Institute Forum for 
State Court Judges: Secrecy Practices in the Courts (July 29, 2000), available at 
http://www.roscoepound.orglnew/OOkratky.pdf(last visited Apr. 1,2004) (noting that the act proposed 
by Kohl failed both in Congress and with drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Senator 
Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) has continually expressed an interest in renewing the efforts of a decade ago but 
has not proposed legislation that his staff believes would be successful. Earlier efforts at such legislation 
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Despite this frustrating record, some federal courts have adopted a self-imposed 
common-law version of sunshine in litigation to limit secrecy orders. Judge 
Marilyn Hall Patel of the Northern District of California has long refused to allow 
the majority of secret settlements presented before her. As she told a reporter 
fifteen years ago, 
The court, which is a public forum, should not be a party to 
closing off from public scrutiny these agreements .... There is a 
practical consideration as well as an ideological one: Secrecy 
agreements are essentially unenforceable. Secrecy is costly to the 
system, because it means that somebody else is going to have to 
start all over from scratch. It just smacks of anti-competitive 
activity. S9 
At least one circuit court of appeal has recognized that "[c]ircumstances 
weighing against confidentiality exist when confidentiality is being sought over 
information important to public health and safety .... ,,60 The Third Circuit Court 
of Appeal noted that this policy might force litigants to enter into a private 
settlement contract in order to keep their information secret, which may result in a 
subsequent contract action to enforce the settlement61--often a difficult course to 
take. 
Over time, federal rule changes regarding the filing of discovery have been less 
than helpful in creating more openness in discovery. Under the former version of 
Rule 5( d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, circuits previously required that 
"all discovery materials must be filed with the district court, unless the court orders 
otherwise. ,,62 However, the current version of the rule, as amended in 2000, states: 
All papers . . . must be filed with the court ... but disclosures 
under Rule 26(a)(1) or (2) and the following discovery requests 
and responses must not be filed until they are used in the 
proceeding or the court orders filing: (i) depositions, (ii) 
interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents or to permit entry 
upon land, and (iv) requests for admission.63 
This change in the rule regarding what must be filed with the court-and what 
cannot be filed-may be necessary from a practical perspective but has an adverse 
include two 1989 bills sponsored by Representative Cardiss Collins (D-ll\'). See H.R. 129, I Olst Congo 
(1989); H.R. 135, IOlst Congo (1989). 
59. B.J. Palermo, Secrecy in the Courts: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Weigh the Benefits and Harm of 
Confidential Settlements, CAL. LAWYER, July 1989, at 32,33. 
60. Pansy V. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772,787 (3d Cir. 1994). 
61. Id. at 788-89. 
62. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987). 
63. FED. R. CIY. P. 5(d). See also New York v. Microsoft Corp., 206 F.R.D. 19,24 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(exploring the effect of the change to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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effect on any rules regarding openness in litigation so long as those rules, like Local 
Rule 5.03, D.S.C., only apply to documents filed with the court. 
Finally, the May 2003 progress report by the Federal Judicial Center found that 
"very few written rules concern sealed settlement agreements specifically."64 The 
report notes: 
Forty-seven district courts (50%) have local rules concerning the 
sealing of court records in civil cases. For fifteen districts the 
rules do not limit the sealing of documents, but instead cover such 
issues as administrative mechanics. . .. Thirty-two districts 
(34%) have local rules governing either the grounds for sealing or 
the duration of sealing or both. 
Eleven districts (12%) restrict the judge's authority to seal 
documents. Nine districts require that the judge fmd "good 
cause" before sealing.65 
This report shows that the South Carolina District Court's Local Rule 5.03 is 
groundbreaking among federal courts. It is a commendable attempt to usher 
secrecy out of the courtroom, and is the boldest successful federal attempt yet at 
limiting secret settlements. 
IV. MORE CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
By examining other venues' attempts to eliminate secret settlements, especially 
in the five states cited above, both the South Carolina District Court and the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina can fashion their rules to be broader, stronger, 
and more effective. These courts can begin by reaffirming presumptions of 
openness where the public health and safety are at issue. These presumptions 
should only be overcome by showing a compelling need for secrecy after factoring 
in the public interest and the public's right to know. 
It is only fair to first ask these questions: If the efforts in South Carolina are so 
laudable, is it reasonable to suggest that these steps have not gone nearly far 
enough? Is it possible for courts to handle any burdens caused by broader 
regulation? I believe the answer to both questions is clearly "yes." 
A. Practical Limitations that Courts Face 
It would be foolish to comment on courts' abilities to act on this issue without 
recognizing the limitations most judges face in dealing with anything beyond the 
everyday business on their dockets. Resources available to courts in general and 
trial courts in particular vary widely from state to state, and even from venue to 
64. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 31 (noting that "[m)ore common are rules on the 
sealing of documents generally"). 
65.Id. 
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venue within states. Some, but by no means all, of these variations include: 
the availability of research attorneys, law clerks, and law 
student interns, and the availability of online research; 
the extent to which the court can utilize magistrates, 
commissioners, special masters, or "private judges"; 
the extent of both system-wide and individual case and 
calendar management problems, including the extent of 
overall court backlog and length of each court's docket; and 
• whether courts are segregated into issue-specific departments 
or at least have separate criminal and civil departments. 
These limits on resources present a particular problem to courts concerned with 
openness and secrecy. Since much of what affects openness happens outside the 
ordinary purview of the court and many matters within the court's purview are not 
resolved before argument, the courts are often only marginally involved in the 
substantive issue in dispute. Taking the time to examine such cases almost 
certainly means extra time and work for both the judge and his or her staff beyond 
the ordinary functions of the court. Given the press of ordinary court business, this 
can be a daunting obstacle. Moreover, most judges are ordinarily loath to interfere 
with agreements made by counsel, particularly those that occur outside the court's 
sight. 
Nevertheless, I believe that judges have several viable, practical options to 
protect the public's right to information. First, I agree with Judge Patel, and more 
recently with Chief Judge Joseph Anderson, that openness fosters judicial economy 
by not requiring parties to start every new piece oflitigation regarding a danger to 
the public from scratch.66 Discovery, once disclosed in one case, remains available 
66. Indeed, at the Secret Settlement Symposium, Chief Judge Anderson made this point several 
times. The draft of his paper distributed at the conference states that "duplicative discovery," as he terms 
it, 
means that in any future litigation involving the same issue ... the litigants will 
bear the cost of duplicative discovery. Nowhere is this more true than in cases 
where litigants, principaIly defendants, have established "document repositories," 
entire buildings where documents produced over the years are stored. The litigant 
in the first case seeks production of documents and is handed the key to the 
document repository. When the case is over, the documents go back, and the 
'needle in the haystack' process is repeated .... 
The burden on the judiciary is repeated as well. I know of nothing more time 
consuming than pouring through boxes of documents in an effort to be fair .... 
Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-
Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 744 (2004). In his remarks, Chief Judge Anderson likened this 
duplicative discovery to the Indiana Jones movie Raiders of the Lost Ark. The audience watches Indiana 
Jones who, after great time and effort (not to mention close encounters with death) recovers the Ark of 
the Covenant, only to learn in the movie's last scene that the ark is buried in a crate in a gigantic storage 
facility containing thousands of seemingly identical crates. Anderson made it clear that courts should 
only have to fmd the "ark" once and that courts should not be parties to burying it again. Joseph F. 
Anderson Jr., Hidden From the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced 
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for future cases. Second, if the issue is dealt with on a systemic, jurisdiction-wide 
level rather than by individual courts, it becomes "policy" and obviates much of the 
difficulty involved in a case-by-case review. 
Courts like those in South Carolina can improve the public safety with little 
time lost to individual trial courts in three ways. First, they should prohibit unfiled 
secret settlements and, especially, agreements to secretize unfiled discovery. 
Second, they should substantially narrow the permissibility of stipulated protective 
orders that undermine rules preventing "contracts" that secretize. Third, courts 
should be able to discipline lawyers who violate court rules, thus putting a chilling 
effect on lawyers who engage in prohibitive practices. 
B. Prohibitions Against Unfiled Discovery 
Courts need to address the issue of secrecy to prevent the secretization of both 
the settlement and the discovery that led to that settlement. However, individual 
courts are understandably hesitant to enact standing orders that such infonnation 
may not be sealed without uniform jurisdictional court rules. 
Perhaps the most seemingly viable argument against openness is that 
secretizing unfiled discovery is necessary because cases would not settle without 
secrecy, and thus openness would increase the caseload of an already overburdened 
judiciary. However, there is no evidence supporting this proposition. In fact, all the 
anecdotal evidence I am aware of supports the idea that cases will still settle. At 
three judicial seminars at which I have been privileged to speak on this topic,67 I 
spoke both informally and in workshops with many judges; none could recall a case 
he or she believed would not have settled had secrecy been forbidden. I did not 
find a single judge who believed cases would not settle in the absence of secrecy. 
James E. Rooks Jr., who has compiled enormous data on secrecy in litigation, 
recently wrote that in his substantial experience speaking with judges at 
conferences, he too has never heard a judge cite a case in which settlement required 
secrecy.68 Rooks notes that "Florida's Sunshine in Litigation law has been in effect 
for nearly 13 years, and there is reason to believe that trial lawyers for both sides 
have simply accepted it and moved on with business.,,69 Rooks concludes that 
speculation about openness' chilling effect on settlements was merely a 
"prediction" before state regulation that never came to pass and for which there is 
Secrecy, Address at the Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy: Fonnation, Debate and Application of 
South Carolilla's New Sec,.ecy Rules (Oct. 24, 2003) (video on file with the South Carolina Law 
Review). 
67. The Roscoe Pound Institute Annual Forumfor State Court Judges, Chicago, (July 2000); The 
American Bar Association Annual Continuing Education Conference for State Appellate Judges, 
Vancouver, B.C. (July 2001); The Louisiana Judicial College (December 2001). 
68. James E. Rooks Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 859, 
872 (2004) (expanding Rooks' position on whether openness chills settlement; see Rooks, supra note 
27). 
69. ld. at 871. 
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no evidence.7o 
At the recent South Carolina conference, not only did Chief Judge Anderson 
challenge the assertion that cases would not settle, but he was joined by Professor 
(and former federal court of appeals judge) Abner Mikva and both of the defense 
counsel who spoke.71 
A far more plausible possibility is that the amount of settlement ultimately 
might be lower, but only because no premium is paid for the plaintiff's silence. 
Indeed, this was the position of one of the defense lawyers at the South Carolina 
conference, Stephen E. Darling.72 In his remarks, Darling asserted that under 
antisecrecy rules defendants would no longer be "willing to pay extra money" to 
settle secretiy.73 Without secrecy, "defendants will not pay more" and plaintiffs 
would have to settle "for a lesser amount." This remarkable statement is 
tantamount to an admission that defendants pay, and plaintiffs accept, more money 
than a case is worth simply to ensure secrecy, or put more bluntly, that secrecy is 
indeed bought and sold. As one court put it: 
[S]ettlements will be entered into in most cases whether or not 
confidentiality can be maintained. The parties might prefer to 
have confidentiality, but this does not mean that they would not 
settle otherwise. For one thing, if the case goes to trial, even more 
is likely to be disclosed than if the public has access to pretrial 
matters. 74 
In any event, even assuming the remote possibility that antisecrecy chills 
settlements, a policy of encouraging settlements is at best a poor reason for 
allowing confidentiality orders. This concept would allow a known harm concealed 
by a sealed settlement agreement to injure subsequent victims. 
Assuming no undue burden on trial courts, there is no reason to limit so-called 
"private" agreements unless the regulating court believes in the now rather 
anachronistic perspective that "courts exist to resolve disputes that are brought to 
them by litigants"; 7S or that "[l]itigants do not give up their privacy rights simply 
because they have walked, voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse 
70. [d. at 874. 
71. Stephen E. Darling, Confidential Settlements: The Defense Perspective, Address at the 
Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy: Formation, Debate and Application of South Carolina's New 
Secrecy Rules (Oct 24, 2003) (video on file with the South Carolina Law Review); Stephen Morrison, 
panel discussion at Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy: Formation, Debate and Application of South 
Carolina's New Secrecy Rules (Oct. 24, 2003) (transcript on file with the South Carolina Law Review). 
72. See remarks of Stephen E. Darling, supra note 71. 
73. [d. 
74. United States v. Ky. UtiIs. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 (E.D. Ky. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 
927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991). 
75. Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U.ILL. L. REv. 457, 468 
(1991). 
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door."76 It is not surprising that those who favor continuing secrecy in discovery 
and settlement agreements believe the court's primary, ifnot its exclusive, function 
is "to decide cases according to the substantive law. The collateral effects of 
litigation should not be allowed to supplant this primary purpose.'>77 
One of these collateral effects, however, is the disclosure of information to the 
public that would not have been available in the absence of the 
litigation-information concerning a public danger.78 At the least, when such 
information reveals the danger of a public hazard or threat, the courts have an 
obligation to the public they serve to disclose this information, and protection from 
danger must take priority over privacy. 
A rule addressing only those agreements actually seen by the court allows 
privacy to trump the public's right to know in most instances. When this is applied 
to significant dangers, the effect on the public is onerous indeed. The only 
reasonable alternative is to require antisecrecy provisions to apply to unfiled 
discovery and settlement agreements. A court is a publicly-funded institution and 
its main function should be to serve the broader interests of the public.79 "Our 
courts are part of the pubic domain," said Professor Abner Mikva at the South 
Carolina conference.8o There is no presumption of privacy; rather, "All 
presumptions must always be in the other direction.',81 As for the claim of 
embarrassment, Mikva submitted that "mere embarrassment" is something most 
adults must learn to handle.82 Indeed, no one has documented any recent sightings 
of corporations blushing red with embarrassment. 
C. Protective Orders and Presumptions of Openness 
One of the most common court-sanctioned procedures used to hide potential 
dangers to the public is the protective order. Defendants in cases dealing with 
alleged physical harm to plaintiffs will commonly seek protective orders as 
necessary to protect a "trade secret" or "commercial advantage.',83 But protective 
76. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 
HARv. L. REv. 428, 466 (1991). 
77. Marcus, supra note 75, at 470 (footnote omitted). 
78. See id. at 469-70. 
79. See Dore, supra note 27, at 296-97. 
80. Abner Mikva, The Role of Judges in Secret Settlements, Address at the Symposium, Court-
Enforced Secrecy: Formation, Debate and Application of South Carolina's New Secrecy Rules (Oct. 
24, 2003) (video on file with the South Carolina Law Review). 
81. Id. 
82.Id. 
83. The 60 Minutes II piece, supra note 28, included a video clip of Firestone executive vice 
president Gary Crigger using those phrases. Of course, for Firestone the validity of this concern would 
require concluding that tires with separation defects had a technology that someone else would want 
to adopt. Crigger's statement to the effect that of course the judge had to agree that those were trade 
secrets stretched credulity even further. The implication that the existence of a stipulated protective 
order rubber-stamped by the judge constitutes the judge's agreement that there were legitimate trade 
secrets underscores the point, made throughout this paper, that even a tacit acceptance will be turned 
into judicial ratification by lawyers and executives trained as polished spin doctors. In counterpoint, the 
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orders may also be used as a means of concealing "smoking guns" and other 
inflammatory discovery. Opponents of sunshine rules posit that these rules will 
vitiate the presumption that trade secrets should be protected.84 This is simply not 
the case. Proprietary information will be protected unless it kills or maims someone. 
However, defendants have no legitimate need to protect a product or service that 
hurts people. If it is a defective product, defendants have no trade secret to protect, 
as no one is going to copy that design. 
Some states and local court jurisdictions have begun tightening the standards 
required for protective orders to promote openness in litigation where the public 
interest is in issue. While there are strong public policy reasons to protect 
information such as trade secrets, commercial processes, and the identities of 
minors, there are at least as strong public policy reasons to protect the health and 
safety interests of the public. Only a presumption of openness in the issuance of 
protective orders will fairly balance these interests. 
Most states, concerned with constitutional standards and Supreme Court 
precedent, have protective order rules patterned on the good cause standard of the 
federal rules.8s Generally, federal courts have three levels of standards for 
protective orders, depending on the purpose for which the order is sought and the 
reasons for the general presumption in favor of access. Only the highest of these 
standards goes significantly beyond a generalized notion of "good cause." 
The highest, most stringent standard should be used in considering all 
protective orders within the scope of this Article. When the proponent claims that 
the protective order is necessary to protect a trade secret or confidential commercial 
information pursuant to Rule 26( c )(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this 
standard requires a three-part test that combines the general threshold showing of 
"good cause,,86 with requirements that the proponent also show that the information 
actually is a trade secret or commercial information and that disclosure would cause 
cognizable harm. 87 
To be effective, courts evaluating the showing made in support of protective 
orders in any case where substantial danger to the public health or safety is in issue 
must create rules that (1) set a presumption of openness and a high standard of 
prooffor legitimate trade secret issues; (2) require a decision on the merits; and (3) 
deny pro forma acceptance of such orders---even when stipulated-as the path of 
least resistance to resolving contested issues. Such courts should also be more 
60 Minutes II piece included a clip of former National Highway Transportation Safety Administration 
head and Public Citizen spokesperson Joan Claybrook calling such protective orders ''unethical.'' 
84. See Kevin Livingston, Open Secrets: Rough Road Ahead/or Legislators and Legal Ethicists 
Who Want to Ban Secret Settlements, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), May 8,2001. 
85. Dore, supra note 27, at 326 n.I72; see also supra note 29 (providing examples of state secret 
settlement statutes). 
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
87. See. e.g., Hasbrouch v. BankAmerica HOllS. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(discussing the heightened standard from Zenith Radio Corp. and holding it not applicable in this case); 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889-90 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (providing 
the heightened three-part test for issuing protective orders). 
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inclined to consider remedies for inappropriate efforts at secrecy, including 
discovery sanctions. 
This means more work for trial courts, at least temporarily, because instead of 
merely accepting stipulations of the parties, these courts would require an actual 
showing that the limitations on access or dissemination of information are 
objectively warranted under the circumstances. However, through a strong 
presumption in a well-crafted rule, a jurisdiction will mitigate the harm posed by 
secrecy in litigation and thereby maintain the public's confidence in its judicial 
system. In short order, the jurisdiction will also see workloads return to normal-or 
even decrease88-as litigants learn of the futility of seeking improper protective 
orders and the possibility of sanctions for requesting such orders in bad faith. 
Although stipulations for protective orders may be the most common form of 
proposed agreements, many others are possible, including stipulations regarding 
privilege or a privilege log; post-judgment stipulations including stipulated 
reversals or vacatur; and various agreements relating to case settlement, from filings 
under seal where court approval is necessary to stipulations to change the name of 
the parties to be unrecognizable to anyone seeking to examine the case file. 89 
Courts proscribing limitations on agreements that harm the public must do so with 
sufficient inclusivity so that such agreements themselves may also be barred. 
Although it is legislation and not a court rule, California's recently passed 
Assembly Bill 634 provides a large portion of a valuable template for dealing with 
protective orders.9O This legislation prevents secretizing information in elder abuse 
cases, among other objectives. Section 2 states, in pertinent part: 
2031.2. (a) In any civil action the factual foundation for which 
establishes a cause of action for a violation of the Elder Abuse 
and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, any information that 
is acquired through discovery and is protected from disclosure by 
a stipulated protective order shall remain subject to the protective 
order, except for information that is evidence of abuse of an elder 
88. Chief Judge Anderson and others argue that less judicial labor will eventually be necessary. 
See Anderson, supra note 66. Moreover, Anderson believes that parties wishing secrecy are most 
unlikely to "opt [to go forward] with the most public of resolutions-a trial" and that the cases that 
matter are those where secrecy is asked for and where it should not be permitted. [d. 
89. I know of no reported cases directly addressing the propriety of such name change 
stipulations, but during the Secret Settlement Symposium, 1upra note 8, Chief Judge Anderson referred 
to a dozen cases in the District of Columbia that had been changed to "Sealed v. Sealed" so that no one 
would know the identities of the actual parties. While researching chapter nine of The Moral Compass 
of the American Lawyer, I learned anecdotally of several such circumstances involving professionals 
who did not want their names sullied by being found in the court record and conditioned settlement on 
such "sanitization." I personally know of two of these instances although the attendant umbrella of 
secrecy makes it impossible to cite to them. Indeed, the very nature of the attendant confidentiality 
makes such name-change situations extremely difficult to uncover, as anyone connected with the matter 
who disclosed information would be breaching a secrecy agreement. 
90. A.B. 634 (Ca. 2003). The portions of the bill relevant to this discussion will be found in CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2031.1-2031.2. 
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or dependent adult as described in Sections 15610.30, 15610.57, 
and 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.91 
In effect, this Civil Code section will allow stipulated protective orders but will 
except from that allowance any such orders that would secretize evidence of 
physical abuse. While I would prefer a more wide-sweeping change in the 
presumption affecting stipulated protective orders, this might simply be asking too 
much of the legislative process. A blanket presumption might well be easier for an 
independent court to accomplish. The California legislature has taken a large step 
in the right direction. The South Carolina courts are invited to follow. 
D. Strengthening the Rules of Professional Ethics 
As helpful as they are, rules of court and statutes are limited in their reach and 
should be supplemented by stronger rules of professional ethics imposed on 
attorneys.92 Instead of lawyers feeling, as they do under the current rules, the 
chilling effect on their duties to the client (commonly, if incorrectly, called "zealous 
advocacy") should they refuse to secretize information, they will feel the chilling 
effect of the prohibition against putting the public in danger when the damages to 
the individual client are minimal. As Tuoro law professor Marjorie Silver, who, 
along with dozens of other ethics professors, has joined in supporting a new ethics 
rule,93 wrote: 
I believe the most compelling response to [those who say this is 
not an issue for ethics rules] is that the lawyer would be able to 
point to an ethical rule that says [we] may not participate in such 
agreements .... Thus, we as a profession might lead rather than 
follow in setting a higher ethical standard ofbehavior.94 
The best legislation and court rules must still include exceptions-to protect, 
for example, the names of young victims of serial molesters. These exceptions 
should be there; there are appropriate exceptions even to the-best rules. But these 
exceptions play right into the weakness of our ethics rules themselves-the historic 
emphasis on placing the duty to the individual client first. Lawyers react to a rule 
with exceptions by arguing that their case is that exception. 
Thus, even with solid public laws that prohibit secretizing information about 
dangers to the public health and safety, the current ethics rules, instead of 
discouraging lawyers from engaging in secret deals, actually encourage it. Lawyers 
91. CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 2031.2 (citation omitted). 
92. I have discussed this issue at considerably greater length in my recently completed paper The 
Judicial Function: Justice between the Parties. or a Broader Public Interest?, supra note *, part of the 
September 2003 Hofstra Law School National Judicial Ethics Symposium. 
93. The text of that proposed ethics rule is attached as Appendix A. 
94. E-mail from Marjorie Silver, Professor of Law, Tuoro Law Center, to Richard A. Zitrin, 
Director, Center for Applied Legal Ethics (on file with author). 
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who go before courts to argue, jointly, that the statute or court rule in question 
doesn't apply in their situation stand an excellent chance of gaining acceptance 
from a judge with a crowded docket. 
The simple ethics rule I propose for South Carolina-and to the extent of its 
authority to devise such rules, for the federal district court-would prohibit lawyers 
from "prevent[ing] or restrict[ing] the availability to the public of information that 
the lawyer reasonably believes ... directly concerns a substantial danger to the 
public health or safety .... "95 Such an ethics rule requires counsel to take the high 
road of openness, notwithstanding the needs of individual clients. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both state and federal courts in South Carolina have approved significant rules 
addressing secrecy in the courts. The district court rule is the strongest of its kind 
in the federal court system. With deep respect, I commend these efforts. 
Unfortunately, the rules are not broad enough to be truly effective-to ensure, at 
least in those cases dealing with the public health and safety, that the public these 
honorable courts serve will be protected from needless danger. Fortunately, there 
are solutions, learned in part through the experiences of other states. These 
solutions are workable, concrete, and lead to a greater public good. 
The three solutions suggested in this Article are not unique, but they would be 
effective regulations.96 I commend the court's attention to them and to further 
progressive thinking on this important subject. The architect of Texas Rule 76a, 
Texas Supreme Court Justice Lloyd Doggett, now a congressman, noted that 
closing a court to public scrutiny of its proceedings is to "shut off the light of the 
law.,,97 
95. See Richard A. Zitrin, Proposed Rule, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 115 (1999). The text of the 
proposed rule is attached as Appendix A. 
96. See supra Parts IV.B.-D. 
97. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 19, at 653 n.4 (quoting State v. Cottman Transmission, 542 
A.2d 859, 864 (1988». 
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APPENDIX A 
PROPOSED RULE 3.2 (B)98 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement among parties to 
a dispute, whether in connection with a lawsuit or otherwise, to prevent or restrict 
the availability to the public of information that [the lawyer reasonably believes] 
[a reasonable lawyer would believe] directly concerns a substantial danger to the 
public health or safety, or to the health or safety of any particular individual(s). 
Comment to Proposed Rule 3.2(B): 
Some settlements have been facilitated by agreements to limit the public's access 
to information obtained both by investigation and through the discovery process. 
However, the public's interest in being free from substantial dangers to health and 
safety requires that no agreement that prevents disclosure to the public of 
information that directly affects that health and safety may be permitted. This 
includes agreements or stipulations to protective orders that would prevent the 
disclosure of such information. It also precludes a lawyer seeking discovery from 
concurring in efforts to seek such orders where the discovery sought is reasonably 
likely to include information covered by subsection (B) of the rule. However, in the 
event a court enters a lawful and [mal protective order without the parties' 
agreement thereto, subsection (B) shall not require the disclosure of the information 
subject to that order. 
Subsection (B) does not require the disclosure of the amount of any settlement. 
Further, in the event of a danger to any particular individual(s) under Subsection 
(B), the rule is intended to require only that the availability of information about the 
danger not be restricted from any persons reasonably likely to be affected, and from 
any governmental regulatory or oversight agencies that would have a substantial 
interest in that danger. In such instances, the rule is not intended to limit disclosure 
to persons not affected by the dangers. 
98. This rule is slightly altered from the rule I proposed at Hofstra in 1998. My students at the 
University of San Francisco and UC Hastings came up with valuable suggestions. One in partiCUlar, to 
clarify something I had assumed, was to add the language "among parties to a dispute." The first 
bracketed portion concerning reasonable belief is my original language; the second bracketed portion 
reflects a suggestion by Professor Robert Cochran of Pepperdine, who gave his name in support of the 
rule. This objective test was also suggested by several of my students. I am comfortable with either 
bracketed portion. 
